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Abstract
The OECD BEPS Action 6 report contains a principal pur-
pose test rule (PPT rule) for the purpose of combating abuse
of tax treaties. This PPT rule is also included in the OECD
Multilateral Instrument.
The PPT rule is (amongst others) applicable when ‘it is rea-
sonable to conclude’ that a benefit (granted by a tax treaty)
was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement/
transaction. This requirement contains two elements: the
reasonableness test and the principal purpose test.
In literature it is observed that (i) the reasonableness test of
the PPT rule could be contrary to the European Union’s
principle of legal certainty; (ii) that the OECD PPT rule gives
the tax authorities too much discretion and, therefore, is not
in line with EU law and (iii) there is doubt whether the
OECD PPT rule contains a genuine economic activity test
and therefore is in contravention of the abuse of law case
law of the CJEU.
In this contribution, I defend that none of the above-men-
tioned reasons the OECD PPT rule is contrary to EU law.
The only potential problem I see is that the OECD PPT rule
is broader (no artificiality required) compared to the GAARs
in Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the Parent–Subsidiary
Directive.
Keywords: GAAR, abuse, tax avoidance, BEPS, principal
purpose test, legal certainty
1 Introduction
The OECD BEPS Action 6 report contains a principal
purpose test rule (PPT rule)1 for the purpose of combat-
ing abuse of tax treaties. This PPT rule is also included
in the Multilateral Convention to implement tax treaty
* Dennis Weber is a professor of European corporate tax law at the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam and director and founder of the Amsterdam Cen-
tre for Tax Law (ACTL).
1. See BEPS Action 6: Preventing the granting of treaty benefits inappro-
priate circumstances, OECD, 5 October 2015.
related measures to prevent base erosion and profit
shifting (often called MLI, the ‘Multilateral Instru-
ment’).
The PPT rule is (amongst others) applicable when ‘it is
reasonable to conclude’ that a benefit (granted by a tax
treaty) was one of the principal purposes of any arrange-
ment/transaction. This requirement contains two ele-
ments: the reasonableness test and the principal purpose
test.
It is observed first in literature that the reasonableness
test of the PPT rule could be contrary to the European
Union’s principle of legal certainty.2 Reference is made
in this regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU) in SIAT3 and Itelcar.4
Second, it is defended in literature that the OECD PPT
rule gives the tax authorities too much discretion and,
therefore, is not in line with EU law (based on the Biehl
case). Third, there is doubt whether the OECD PPT
rule contains a genuine economic activity test and there-
fore is in contravention of the abuse of law case law of
the CJEU.5
If the reasonableness test of the PPT rule is not in line
with the EU principle of legal certainty or any other EU
principle, this would mean that the EU Member States
are not permitted to incorporate the PPT rule via the
MLI or in another way in their bilateral tax treaties.
2. See E.C.C.M. Kemmeren, ‘Where is EU Law in the OECD BEPS Discus-
sion?’ (editorial), 23(4) EC Tax Review 190 (2014) followed by: Kokolia
and Chatziioakeimidou, ‘BEPS Impact on EU Law: Hybrid Payments and
Abusive Behaviour’, ET, April 2015, at 155 and E. Pinetz, ‘Final Report
of Action 6 of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative:
Prevention of Treaty Abuse’, IBFD Bulletin 113 (2016).
3. CJEU 5 July 2012, Case C-318/10 (SIAT v État belge), ECLI:EU:C:
2012:415.
4. CJEU 3 October 2013, Itelcar, C-282/12.
5. Fourth, in the literature the question is asked whether the fact that
under the PPT rule there must be ‘one of the principal purposes’,
whereas in the abuse case law of the CJEU it must concern a ‘wholly
artificial arrangement’, is in contravention of EU law. I shall not discuss
this in this contribution. See on this: D. Weber, ‘The New Common
Minimum Anti-abuse Rule in the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive: Back-
ground, Impact, Applicability and Effect’, 44(2) Intertax 98 (2016),
paras. 6.1 and 6.2.
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In this contribution, I therefore discuss the question of
whether the reasonableness test of the PPT rule is con-
trary to the EU principle of legal certainty. For this, I
discuss the case law of the CJEU in this area and subject
the cases SIAT and Itelcar, which are cited in the litera-
ture in order to defend that the PPT rule is contrary to
the principle of legal certainty, to further examination,
together with a number of other judgments of the
CJEU.
2 The Principal Purpose Test
(PPT)
2.1 Introduction: The PPT Rule
The PPT rule as is included in the MLI (the content of
which is the same as the PPT rule which is incorporated
in the OECD BEPS Action 6 report) reads as follows:
Article 7 – Prevention of Treaty Abuse
1. Notwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax
Agreement, a benefit under the Covered Tax Agree-
ment shall not be granted in respect of an item of
income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude, hav-
ing regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that
obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purpo-
ses of any arrangement or transaction that resulted
directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is estab-
lished that granting that benefit in these circumstan-
ces would be in accordance with the object and pur-
pose of the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax
Agreement.
2.2 The Reasonableness Test
2.2.1 An Objective Analysis of All Relevant Facts and
Circumstances
The PPT rule is applicable when ‘it is reasonable to
conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circum-
stances, that obtaining that benefit was one of the prin-
cipal purposes of any arrangement or transaction’. This
requirement contains two elements: the reasonableness
test and the principal purpose test. Although those two
tests are distinct elements of the PPT rule, they are
inextricably linked and, in my view, must be applied
jointly.
The wording ‘it is reasonable to conclude, having regard
to all relevant facts and circumstances’ is the so-called
‘reasonableness test’. For the application of the reasona-
bleness test in the PPT rule, points 10 and 11 of the
Commentary on the PPT rule in the final report on
Action 6 are of importance. These read as follows:6
10. To determine whether or not one of the principal
purposes of any person concerned with an arrange-
ment or transaction is to obtain benefits under the
Convention, it is important to undertake an objective
6. See BEPS Action 6, above n. 1, paras. 10 and 11 of the Commentary on
the PPT rule.
analysis of the aims and objects of all persons
involved in putting that arrangement or transaction
in place or being a party to it. What are the purposes
of an arrangement or transaction is a question of fact
which can only be answered by considering all cir-
cumstances surrounding the arrangement or event on
a case by case basis. It is not necessary to find conclu-
sive proof of the intent of a person concerned with an
arrangement or transaction, but it must be reasonable
to conclude, after an objective analysis of the relevant
facts and circumstances, that one of the principal
purposes of the arrangement or transaction was to
obtain the benefits of the tax convention. It should
not be lightly assumed, however, that obtaining a
benefit under a tax treaty was one of the principal
purposes of an arrangement or transaction and mere-
ly reviewing the effects of an arrangement will not
usually enable a conclusion to be drawn about its pur-
poses. Where, however, an arrangement can only be
reasonably explained by a benefit that arises under a
treaty, it may be concluded that one of the principal
purposes of that arrangement was to obtain the bene-
fit.
11. A person cannot avoid the application of this
paragraph by merely asserting that the arrangement
or transaction was not undertaken or arranged to
obtain the benefits of the Convention. All of the evi-
dence must be weighed to determine whether it is
reasonable to conclude that an arrangement or trans-
action was undertaken or arranged for such purpose.
The determination requires reasonableness, suggest-
ing that the possibility of different interpretations of
the events must be objectively considered.
Reasonableness tests are common to common law sys-
tems;7 for example, they are included in the General
Anti-Tax Avoidance Rule (GAAR) of the UK (see also
later), Australia, Canada and South Africa.8 By includ-
ing a reasonableness test in a GAAR, the subjective
intention that obtaining a tax benefit was the (main/
principal, etc.) purpose for a transaction, is objectified:9
to know the subjective intention of a taxpayer or
arrangement, an objective analysis must be made of the
(objective) facts and circumstances.
The subjective test in the PPT rule (the principal pur-
pose) is objectified by the reasonableness test:10 ‘it is rea-
sonable to conclude [means: objective analysis], having
regard to all relevant facts and circumstances’ [means:
objective facts and circumstances]. (emphasis added)
7. Reasonableness tests are also used outside of tax law, for example, ‘a
reasonable doubt’ in UK, US and Canadian criminal law.
8. See P. Rosenblatt, General Anti-Avoidance Rules for Major Developing
Countries, Kluwer Law International (2014), para. 3.2.1.
9. See R. Krever, ‘General Report: GAARs’, published in GAARS – A Key
Element of Tax Systems in the Post-BEPS, European and International
Tax Law and Policy Series, No. 3, IBFD (2016), in para. 1.4. ‘taxpayer’s
purpose’.
10. See also Reinout Kok, ‘The Principal Purpose Test in Tax Treaties Under
BEPS 6’, 44(5) Intertax (2016), at 406.
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That the reasonableness test is an objective test is clearly
worded in the Commentary to the PPT:11
to determine whether or not one of the principal pur-
poses of any person concerned with an arrangement
or transaction is to obtain benefits under the Conven-
tion, it is important to undertake an objective analysis
of the aims and objects of all persons involved in put-
ting that arrangement or transaction in place or being
a party to it. What are the purposes of an arrange-
ment or transaction, is a question of fact, which can
only be answered by considering all circumstances sur-
rounding the arrangement or event on a case-by-case
basis. It is not necessary to find conclusive proof on
intent of a person concerned with an arrangement or
transaction, but it must be reasonable to conclude
after an objective analysis of the relevant facts and cir-
cumstances, that one of the principal purposes of the
arrangement or transaction was to obtain the benefits
of the tax convention. (emphasis added)
It is also remarked in point 11 of the Commentary that
all relevant facts and circumstances (the evidence) ‘must
be weighed to determine whether it is reasonable to con-
clude that an arrangement or transaction was undertak-
en or arranged for such purpose’. In my view, substance
can only be given to the wording, can ‘be weighed’,
when the tax authorities substantiate with reasons in the
assessment how the various facts and circumstances
relate to each other.
Furthermore, in point 11 of the Commentary, it is
observed that ‘The determination requires reasonable-
ness, suggesting that the possibility of different inter-
pretations of the events must be objectively considered’.
In my view, this should be interpreted such that in the
interpretation of the ‘facts and circumstances’ these
must be interpreted such as a reasonable (third) person
would have interpreted those facts and circumstances.
The analysis of the facts and circumstances is therefore
also objective.
The assessment of the tax authorities that obtaining a
tax benefit was one of the principal purposes of a trans-
action must thus be based on:
– all relevant facts and circumstances
– which must be weighed
– in an objective analysis
It can be gathered from this that this assessment is not
an easy test. That is also emphasised in the Commenta-
ry. In point 10, it is remarked: ‘It should not be lightly
assumed’ (emphasis added) and in that regard, it is poin-
ted out that ‘merely reviewing the effects of an arrange-
ment will not usually enable a conclusion to be drawn
about its purposes’ (emphasis added). It is shown from
this that the tax authorities may not assume that a tax
benefit is the principal purpose of an arrangement to
obtain a treaty benefit, but also that they may not only
point out the effects in their assessment so to come to the
11. See BEPS Action 6, above n. 1, para. 10 of the Commentary on the PPT
rule.
conclusion that the principal purpose of an arrangement
is to obtain a treaty benefit. The tax authorities may
thus, for example, not point out a large tax benefit and
from that, draw the conclusion that obtaining that bene-
fit was one of the principal purposes of an arrangement
or transaction. On the other hand, the taxpayer may not
merely assert this. In point 11 of the Commentary it is
observed in this regard: ‘A person cannot avoid the
application of this paragraph by merely asserting that
the arrangement or transaction was not undertaken or
arranged to obtain the benefits of the Convention.’
In the Commentary on the OECD PPT rule, several
examples are given. As an example that the OECD PPT
rule is not applicable, a reference is made to the situa-
tion that a certain shareholding in a company is ‘related
to the expansion’ of the shareholders ‘business and low-
er manufacturing costs’.12 In another example, the
OECD PPT rule is not applicable because there is the
establishment of a regional group services company that
has a ‘real business’, whereby the service company
‘exercises substantive economic functions, using real
assets and assuming real risk’ and that the business is
carried on by the company ‘through its own person-
nel’.13 In the OECD Action 6-report is also a reference
to ‘valid commercial reasons’.14 It appears from the
examples given in the Commentary that many different
facts and circumstances must be weighed against each
other in order to reach the conclusion on whether there
is or is not treaty abuse. It also appears from this that
the PPT rule requires an in-depth study of the facts and
circumstances, and that nothing may be based on
assumptions.
2.2.2 Comparable Reasonableness Test in UK GAAR
As mentioned above, the reasonableness test is often
included in GAARs in common law systems. In 2013, a
GAAR was introduced in the UK, and although there is
nothing to show that the OECD PPT rule is based on
the UK GAAR, their reasonableness tests are similar.
The reasonableness test in the UK GAAR reads:15
‘Arrangements are “tax arrangements” if, having regard
to all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to conclude
that the obtaining of a tax advantage was the main pur-
pose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangements’
(emphasis added). The following observation is made on
this in the HMRC GAAR Guidance:16
12. Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstan-
ces, Action 6: final report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
project, 5 October 2015, Commentary on the PPT rule: point 14, exam-
ple C (manufacturing plant in developing country).
13. Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstan-
ces, Action 6: final report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
project, 5 October 2015, Commentary on the PPT rule: point 14, exam-
ple G.
14. Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstan-
ces, Action 6: final report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
project, 5 October 2015, Commentary on the PPT rule: point 8.
15. Art. 207(1) Finance Act 2013.
16. HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) General Anti Abuse Rule (GAAR)
guidance (Approved by the Advisory Panel with effect from 30 January
2015), c.3.3.
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The expression ‘reasonable to conclude’ shows that
this is an objective test, which is to be applied by tak-
ing into account all the relevant circumstances and
asking whether, in the light of those circumstances, a
reasonable conclusion would be that obtaining a tax
advantage was the main purpose, or one of the main
purposes, of the arrangements. It is neither necessary
nor appropriate to enquire whether any particular
person (for example the taxpayer himself, or a pro-
moter of the arrangements, if there was one) actually
had that intention. In practice, though, it would be
very rare to find a situation where objectively the
obtaining of a tax advantage appeared to be one of the
main purposes of an arrangement although, subjec-
tively, the participators did not in fact have any such
aim. (emphasis added)
Also here we see clearly that the reasonableness test is
an objective test in which the subjective intention of the
taxpayer is derived from objective circumstances and
that it must concern a ‘reasonable conclusion’.
2.2.3 Different Interpretation in Literature
In literature, a different interpretation of the reasonable-
ness test is also defended. Lang writes:17 ‘On the other
hand, the requirements are not too demanding – it must
be merely “reasonable”: but not, for instance, compel-
ling. Therefore, the tax authority does not need to pro-
duce full evidence thereof”. Bhargava also observes that
“the tax authorities will find it easier to prove” “as the
threshold that is set out is very low (“reasonable to con-
clude”)’.18 And Pinetz:19 ‘the requirements are (…)
quite lenient, as it need only be reasonable to conclude’.
I do not agree with this interpretation. In my view, the
wording ‘reasonable to conclude’ does not mean the
weight of the burden of proof on the tax authorities, but
it means that the assessment of the tax authority must
be obtained through an objective analysis based on facts
and circumstances (and it has to weigh all facts and cir-
cumstances; may thus not be based on an assumption; or
only refer to the tax advantage as such).
Lang writes:20 ‘In practice, furnishing evidence of the
motives will therefore not be relevant, but the tax
authorities will be tempted to presume intention simply
because of the presence of a benefit’ (emphasis added).
Pinetz also notes that ‘the wording of the provision pro-
posed by the OECD makes it easy for tax authorities to
assume abuse’ (emphasis added). In my view, that is not
what the PPT rule prescribes. The reasonableness test
in the OECD PPT rule prescribes an objective analysis
of all relevant facts and circumstances, such as this is,
17. M. Lang, BEPS Action 6: Introducing an antiabuse rule in tax treaties,
Tax Notes International, 655, at 658.
18. A. Bhargava, ‘The Principal Purpose Test: Functioning, Elements and
Legal Relevance’, in Blum and Seiler (eds.), Preventing Treaty Abuse,
Series on International Tax Law (2016), 311, at 318.
19. Pinetz, above n. 2, at 116. See also E. Pinetz, ‘Use of the Principal Pur-
pose Test to Prevent Treaty Abuse’, in Lang et al. (eds.), Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting (BEPS), Series on International Tax Law (2016),
Linde, at 271.
20. Lang, above n. 17.
often to be found in GAARs in common law systems,
and from the OECD Commentary it is clearly observed
(see also here above) that an assessment that is based on
an assumption or is only based on the effect of an
arrangement (the tax benefit) is not sufficient.
In literature, moreover, it is noted that the subjective
test in the PPT rule cannot be rebutted by proving that
valid commercial reasons exist for the transaction.21 In
my view this is incorrect. The PPT rule requires that
the tax authorities determine, by means of the reasona-
bleness test, the principal purpose of the transaction.
When the tax authorities come to the conclusion on the
basis of the facts and circumstances at their disposal that
the principal purpose of an arrangement is to obtain a
tax benefit, then the taxpayer can always dispute this in
an objection against his tax assessment or before a court.
In that regard, the taxpayer can thus put forward the
relevant facts and circumstances. In addition, in prac-
tice, before they apply the PPT rule, in most situations
the tax authorities will request the taxpayer by letter to
provide relevant facts and circumstances. In such a case,
the taxpayer can thus provide his economic reasons
(based on facts and circumstances) for an arrangement.
When the tax authority only applies the PPT rule on the
basis of the fact that there is a tax benefit, then the
application of the PPT rule must, in my view, be
refused by a national court. It is shown from the Com-
mentary, namely, that on the basis of solely the ‘effect’
of an arrangement, the PPT rule may not be applied.
2.3 EU-Problems in Literature
In literature, it is remarked that the reasonableness test
of the PPT rule is contrary to the principle of legal cer-
tainty. Kemmeren22 remarks on this that the reasonable-
ness test ‘may create too much uncertainty to taxpayers’.
He refers particularly to the Itelcar case in which the
CJEU ruled on whether national legislation was in line
with the requirement of legal certainty. His analysis
would seem to be endorsed by Kokolia/Chatziioakeimi-
dou23 and Pinetz.24 Baker examines the reasonableness
test of the PPT rule also on compatibility with the EU
principle of legal certainty.25 He too mentions in that
regard the judgments of the CJEU in SIAT and Itelcar.
He subsequently compares the PPT rule with the com-
parable anti-abuse rule such as is included in the
21. See O. Koriak, ‘The Principal Purpose Test Under BEPS Action 6: Is the
OECD Proposal Compliant with EU Law?’ ET (2016), at 552 and C.
Panayi, ‘The Compatibility of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Proposals with EU Law’, 1(2) IBFD Bulletin 95 (2016).
22. Kemmeren, above n. 2.
23. Kokolia and Chatziioakeimidou, above n. 2 and Pinetz, above n. 2.
24. Pinetz, above n. 2.
25. P. Baker, The BEPS Action Plan in the light of EU Law: Treaty Abuse,
2015 BTR, no 3, at 408.
51
Dennis Weber doi: 10.5553/ELR.000081 - ELR August 2017 | No. 1
Parent–Subsidiary Directive26 and notes that the PPT
rule and this anti-abuse rule are comparable, and that it
can be assumed that the anti-abuse rule of the Parent–
Subsidiary Directive is in accordance with Union law.27
On the basis thereof, he comes to the conclusion that, ‘it
is a reasonable observation that the proposed PPT is not
significant less precise or clear than this general anti-
avoidance rule inserted into the parent-subsidiary direc-
tive’. Baker, therefore, sees no contravention of the
principle of legal certainty.
3 The Principle of Legal
Certainty in the (Tax) Case
Law of the Court of Justice
of the EU
3.1 Knowledge of Legal Rules and Foreseeability
of Legal Situations
The principle of legal certainty is a fundamental princi-
ple of EU law28 and serves to ensure that legal rules are
clear and precise and also that the legal situations and
relationships governed by Community law are foreseea-
ble (see Duff).29 Accordingly, the principle safeguards
the ability of interested parties to ascertain what their
legal rights and obligations are at a certain moment,
which in turn ensures that they can be certain as to the
legal and economic consequences of their actions.30 In
Van Es,31 it was considered that ‘the principle of legal
certainty is a fundamental principle of Community law
(…) which requires in particular that rules imposing
charges on a taxpayer be clear and precise so that he
may be able to ascertain unequivocally what his rights
and obligations are and take steps accordingly.’32 In the
Van Es judgment (a customs case), a Regulation could
not be applied to certain tax assessments because the
Commission had not adjusted this Regulation and, as a
result, a taxpayer was unable to precisely determine his
legal position.
26. Art. 1(2) of the Parent–Subsidiary Directive lays down that: ‘Member
States shall not grant the benefits of this Directive to an arrangement or
a series of arrangements that, having put into place for the main pur-
pose or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage which
defeats the object or purpose of this Directive, are not genuine having
regard to all relevant facts and circumstances’. See Council Directive
(EU) 2015/121 of 27 January 2015 amending Directive 2011/96/EU on
the common system of taxation applicable in the case parent companies
and subsidiaries of different Member States {2015} OJ L21/1.
27. See also para. 61 of Weber (2016), above n. 5.
28. ECJ 21 September 1983, joined cases 205/82-215/82 (Deutsche Milch-
kontor), ECR 1983, at 2633 (Opinion VerLoren van Themaat).
29. See CJEU 15 February 1996, case C-63/93 (Duff), ECR I-569 (Opinion
Cosmas), para. 20.
30. Cf. AG Cosmas in his Opinion to ECJ 15 February 1996, case C-63/93
(Duff), ECR I-569, paras. 23 through 25.
31. CJEU 13 February 1996, case C-143/93 (Van Es), ECR I-431 (Opinion
Elmer).
32. Id., para. 27.
3.2 The Principle of Legal Certainty in Tax
Cases
The principle of legal certainty has been the subject of
discussion in a number of (tax) cases.
3.2.1 Commission/Greece
In Commission/Greece,33 the question was whether
Directive 69/335/EEC concerning indirect taxes on the
raising of capital34 had been implemented correctly into
Greek domestic legislation. The discussion in the case
concerned the question whether the domestic law that
charged capital duty on intra-EU transfers of the effec-
tive centre of management or registered office insofar as
the company concerned is not subject to capital duty in
the Member State of origin, is in line with Directive
69/335/EEC. Of importance in this regard is that the
CJEU remarked in paragraph 24:
While the Hellenic Republic acknowledges that this
distinction has not been clearly drawn until now and
may have led to a degree of confusion, it nevertheless
considers that the criterion of being ‘subject to’ duty
is in accordance with the ‘capital company’ criterion
prescribed by Directive 69/335 and thus correctly
transposes Article 4(1)(g) and (h) and (3)(b) of the
directive.
In the judgment, the CJEU explained why it was of the
opinion that the Greek implementation was contrary to
Directive 69/335/EEC. Subsequently, in paragraph 33,
it added:
Furthermore, inasmuch as the Hellenic Republic
acknowledges that the distinction between ‘actual
taxation’ and being ‘subject to’ duty was not clearly
made in the transfer rules at issue and may have led
to a degree of confusion, it should be added that, in
any event, such rules do not satisfy the requirements
established by the case-law concerning transposition
of directives. According to that case-law, it is particu-
larly important, in order to satisfy the requirement
for legal certainty, that individuals should have the
benefit of a clear and precise legal situation enabling
them to ascertain the full extent of their rights and,
where appropriate, to rely on them before the nation-
al courts (see to this effect, in particular, Case
C-236/95 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-4459,
paragraph 13, and Case C-177/04 Commission v
France [2006] ECR I-2461, paragraph 48). The rules
cannot be regarded as establishing a clear and precise
legal situation of that kind.
It appears from the judgment that Greece ‘acknowledg-
es’ that the domestic law was not clear and led to ‘a
degree of confusion’. Greece thus conceded that, in fact,
its domestic law was contrary to the principle of legal
33. ECJ 7 June 2007, case C-178/05 (Commission/Greece), ECR I-4185.
34. Council Directive 69/335/EEC of 17 July 1969 concerning indirect taxes
on the raising of capital (OJ, English Special Edition 1969 (II), at 412), as
amended by Council Directive 85/303/EEC of 10 June 1985 (OJ 1985 L
156, at 23) (‘Directive 69/335’).
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certainty. For the CJEU thus, a piece of cake: the CJEU
itself did not establish that the domestic legislation was
not clear and did not precisely reflect the rights of a tax-
payer, but based itself on the statements of the Member
State. The arguments on the principle of legal certainty
are also used by the CJEU as extra argument to deem
the national law not in line with EU law.
3.2.2 SIAT
One direct taxation case in which the CJEU found a
national anti-abuse law not in line with the principle of
legal certainty is SIAT.35
This case concerned a Belgian deduction of expenses
limitation, which denied a deduction for a payment for
performances or services if they were paid to a non-resi-
dent company, where the non-resident company was
not subject, in the Member State of establishment, to
tax on income or was subject, as regards the relevant
income, to a tax regime that is appreciably more advan-
tageous than the applicable regime in Belgium. In such a
situation, the payments were not deductible unless the
taxpayer could prove that such payments related to gen-
uine and proper transactions and did not exceed the
normal limits, whereas, under the general domestic rule,
such payments were to be regarded as deductible busi-
ness expenses if they were necessary for acquiring or
retaining taxable income and if the taxpayer demonstra-
ted the authenticity and amount of such expenses.
The CJEU considered this rule a restriction on the free
movement of services. With regard to the justification
grounds, the Court observed (paragraph 48):
It must therefore be held that legislation such as that
at issue in the main proceedings is suitable for attain-
ing the objectives of preventing tax evasion and
avoidance and of preserving both the effectiveness of
fiscal supervision and the balanced allocation between
Member States of the power to impose taxes, all of
which – as is apparent from the foregoing – are close-
ly linked in the case before the referring court.
The Court then examined whether or not that legisla-
tion goes beyond what is necessary in order to attain
those objectives. Under this proportionality test, the
Court followed the strict line of reasoning it had estab-
lished under the anti-abuse case law. Of particular
importance is that the Court considered (paragraph 50):
It is clear from the case law of the Court that, where
legislation is predicated on an assessment of objective
and verifiable elements for the purposes of determin-
ing whether a transaction represents a wholly artifi-
cial arrangement entered into solely for tax reasons, it
may be regarded as not going beyond what is necessa-
ry to prevent abusive practices, if, on each occasion
on which the existence of such an arrangement can-
35. SIAT (C-318/10), the analysis in this case is partly based on one of my
previous analyses on this case, which was published in para. 5.3 of D.
Weber, ‘Abuse of Law in European Tax Law: An Overview and Some
Recent Trends in the Direct and Indirect Tax Case Law of the ECJ’, part
2, IBFD European Taxation 313 (July 2013).
not be ruled out, that legislation gives the taxpayer an
opportunity, without subjecting him to undue
administrative constraints, to provide evidence of any
commercial justification that there may have been for
that arrangement.
Here, the Court referred to paragraph 82 of the Test
Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation-case. This
was nothing new but was simply a reiteration of old case
law. The Court then went on to test whether or not the
Belgian rule satisfied the above requirements. The
Court considered the following (paragraphs 54-58):
54 However, as has been indicated in paragraph 25
above, the special rule may be applied where pay-
ments are made to providers who, by virtue of the
legislation of the Member State in which they are
established, are not subject there to a tax on income
or are subject there, for the relevant income, to a tax
regime which is appreciably more advantageous than
the applicable regime in Belgium.
55 Accordingly, as the Advocate General noted in
point 71 of his Opinion, the special rule requires the
Belgian taxpayer to provide, as a matter of course,
proof that all the services are genuine and proper and
that all related payments are normal, without the tax
authority being required to provide even prima facie
evidence of tax evasion or avoidance.
56 The special rule can be brought to bear without
any objective criterion, verifiable by a third party,
being applied to test for the existence of a wholly arti-
ficial arrangement which does not reflect economic
reality and which has been made with the aim of
escaping the tax normally due on the profits gener-
ated by activities carried out in the national territory,
since account is taken only of the level of tax imposed
on the service provider in the Member State in which
that provider is established.
57 It must be stated that, as has been noted in para-
graph 27 above, a rule framed in such terms does not
make it possible, at the outset, to determine its scope
with sufficient precision and its applicability remains
a matter of uncertainty.
58 Such a rule does not, therefore, meet the require-
ments of the principle of legal certainty, in accord-
ance with which rules of law must be clear, precise
and predictable as regards their effects, in particular
where they may have unfavourable consequences for
individuals and undertakings (see, to that effect, Case
C-17/03 VEMW and Others [2005] ECR I-4983,
paragraph 80, and Joined Cases C-72/10 and
C-77/10 Costa and Cifone [2012] ECR I-0000, para-
graph 74). As it is, a rule which does not meet the
requirements of the principle of legal certainty cannot
be considered to be proportionate to the objectives
pursued.
In paragraph 57, the Court referred to paragraph 27 of
the decision. The Court stated the following in para-
graphs 26-28:
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26 As the Belgian Government acknowledges, in the
absence of a statutory definition, or administrative
instructions as to what is to be understood by ‘a tax
regime which is appreciably more advantageous than
the applicable regime in Belgium’, the assessment
concerning the applicability of the special rule is car-
ried out on a case-by-case basis by the tax authority,
under the supervision of the national courts.
27 In those circumstances, the scope of that special
rule is not delimited with sufficient precision at the
outset and, in a situation where the service provider
is established in a Member State other than the King-
dom of Belgium and is subject there to a tax regime
which is more advantageous than the applicable
regime in Belgium, there is uncertainty as to whether
the foreign regime will be considered to be a ‘regime
which is appreciably more advantageous’ and wheth-
er, as a result, the special rule will apply.
28 Accordingly, that special rule – which lays down
stricter conditions for being allowed to deduct busi-
ness expenses than those laid down in the general
rule and the scope of which has not been delimited
with precision beforehand – is liable both to dissuade
Belgian taxpayers from exercising their right to the
freedom to provide services and from making use of
the services of providers established in another Mem-
ber State and to dissuade those providers from offer-
ing their services to recipients established in Belgium
(see, to that effect, Case C-422/01 Skandia and Ram-
stedt [2003] ECR I-6817, paragraph 28 and the case-
law cited).
In SIAT, the Court rejected a general anti-abuse rule
that reverses the burden of proof in regard to the deduc-
tion of expenses (places it on the taxpayer) where the
payments to the recipients fall under a ‘a tax regime
which is appreciably more advantageous than the appli-
cable regime in Belgium’ on the basis of the fact that
such a measure is too general and is contrary to the
principle of legal certainty.
As concerns the opinion that the Belgian law is contrary
to the principle of legal certainty,36 we see that the
CJEU, just as in Commission/Greece, bases itself on
statements of the Member State on the interpretation of
the national law. In paragraph 26, the CJEU considers,
namely, that
As the Belgian Government acknowledges, in the
absence of a statutory definition, or administrative
instructions as to what is to be understood by ‘a tax
regime which is appreciably more advantageous than
the applicable regime in Belgium,’ the assessment
concerning the applicability of the special rule is car-
ried out on a case-by-case basis by the tax authority,
under the supervision of the national courts. (empha-
sis added)
36. Here, I make no observations on the reasoning of the CJEU that the
Belgian rule was too general (that rule was indeed too general, but in
my view for other reasons than those given by the CJEU in SIAT); see
further: Weber (2013), above n. 35.
The CJEU, ‘in those circumstances’, is of the opinion
that ‘the scope of that special rule is not delimited with
sufficient precision at the outset’ and ‘there is uncertain-
ty as to whether the foreign regime will be considered to
be a ‘regime which is appreciably more advanta-
geous’and whether, as a result, the special rule will
apply’ (see paragraph 27). We see thus both in Commis-
sion/Greece and in SIAT that the CJEU follows the
qualification of the Member State that a national rule
leads to uncertainty because this is not clear (‘not clear-
ly’) (Commission/Greece); or is unclear by the absence of
a statutory definition, or because of absence of instruc-
tions (SIAT) or it leads to ‘a degree of confusion’ (Com-
mission/Greece).
3.2.3 Itelcar
The Itelcar judgment37 concerns Portuguese thin capi-
talisation legislation. On the basis of this legislation,
interest paid between companies between which ‘special
relations’ exist is under certain conditions excluded
from deduction from the profit in Portugal. The EU law
issue was that interest paid to a lender established in a
third country (in the case of Itelcar, the United States)
is excluded from deduction, but if the lender was estab-
lished in Portugal, the interest was always deductible.
According to the CJEU, this was a restriction of the free
movement of capital between the Member States and
third countries. The next question was whether such a
restriction may be justified by an overriding reason in
the public interest. The Portuguese Government argued
that the rules intended
to combat tax evasion and avoidance by preventing
the practice of ‘thin capitalisation’, which consists of
eroding the basis of assessment for corporation tax in
Portugal through the payment of interest, which is
deductible, instead of profits, which are not deducti-
ble. That practice involves the arbitrary transfer of
taxable revenues from that Member State to a non-
member country, as a result of which the profits of a
company are not taxed in the State in which those
profits have been generated.
In that connection, the CJEU recalled the settled case-
law that
a national measure restricting the free movement of
capital may be justified where it specifically targets
wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect
economic reality and the sole purpose of which is to
avoid the tax normally payable on the profits gener-
ated by activities carried out on the national territory.
(paragraph 34)
Subsequently, the CJEU ruled that ‘such rules are an
appropriate means of attaining the objective of combat-
ting tax evasion and avoidance’. Finally, the CJEU
examined whether the Portuguese rules did not go
37. CJEU 3 October 2013, Itelcar, C-282/12.
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beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objec-
tive. In that regard, the CJEU reiterated its case law that
where rules are predicated on an assessment of objec-
tive and verifiable elements for the purposes of deter-
mining whether a transaction represents a wholly
artificial arrangement entered into for tax reasons
alone, they may be regarded as not going beyond
what is necessary to prevent tax evasion and avoid-
ance, if, on each occasion on which the existence of
such an arrangement cannot be ruled out, those rules
give the taxpayer an opportunity, without subjecting
him to undue administrative constraints, to provide
evidence of any commercial justification that there
may have been for that transaction. (paragraph 37)
The CJEU found first, that the Portuguese legislation
provided for such an opportunity to provide proof
(paragraph 39). Subsequently, the CJEU saw another
problem. In that regard, the CJEU considered the fol-
lowing:
41 As can be seen from paragraph 20 above, the term
‘special relations’, as defined in Article 58(4) of the
CIRC, encompasses situations that do not necessarily
involve the lending company of a non-member coun-
try holding shares in the resident borrowing compa-
ny. Where there is no such shareholding, the effect of
the method for calculating the excess indebtedness
laid down in Article 61(3) of the CIRC is that any
credit arrangement between those two companies
falls to be regarded as excessive.
42 It is clear that, in the circumstances described in
the paragraph above, the rules at issue in the main
proceedings also affect conduct the economic reality
of which cannot be disputed. In presuming that, in
such circumstances, the basis of assessment for cor-
poration tax payable by the resident borrowing com-
pany is being eroded, those rules go beyond what is
necessary to attain their objective.
43 Moreover, in so far as the rules at issue in the
main proceedings are applied – in accordance with
the statements made by the Portuguese Government,
as summarised in paragraph 21 above – only to situa-
tions in which the lending company has a direct or
indirect shareholding in the borrowing company, so
that the situation referred to in paragraph 41 above
does not arise, the fact remains that such a limitation
on the scope of those rules does not follow from their
wording, which tends, on the contrary, to suggest
that they do cover special relations where there is no
such shareholding.
44 That being so, the rules in question do not make it
possible, at the outset, to determine their scope with
sufficient precision. Accordingly, they do not meet
the requirements of legal certainty, in accordance
with which rules of law must be clear, precise and
predictable as regards their effects, especially where
they may have unfavourable consequences for indi-
viduals and companies. As it is, rules which do not
meet the requirements of the principle of legal cer-
tainty cannot be considered to be proportionate to the
objectives pursued. (see SIAT, paragraphs 58 and 59)
It follows from those considerations that the Portuguese
provision contains some ‘overkill’. The anti-abuse rule
is namely also applicable when a loan is provided by a
third party (which has no shares in the recipient of the
loan); in situations with third parties, the Portuguese
thin capitalisation rule leads to the conclusion that each
debt between the lender and the borrower must be con-
sidered excessive due to which the interest was not
deductible. The Portuguese Government contradicted
this interpretation of the Portuguese provision and
observed that the anti-abuse provision was only applica-
ble to situations in which the lending company has a
direct or indirect shareholding in the borrowing compa-
ny. On this, the CJEU considered that ‘such a limitation
on the scope of those rules does not follow from their
wording, which tends, on the contrary, to suggest that
they do cover special relations where there is no such
shareholding’; to subsequently consider (paragraph 44):
That being so, the rules in question do not make it
possible, at the outset, to determine their scope with
sufficient precision. Accordingly, they do not meet
the requirements of legal certainty, in accordance
with which rules of law must be clear, precise and
predictable as regards their effects, especially where
they may have unfavourable consequences for indi-
viduals and companies. As it is, rules which do not
meet the requirements of the principle of legal cer-
tainty cannot be considered to be proportionate to the
objectives pursued (see SIAT, paragraphs 58 and 59).
In Itelcar, we see an anti-abuse provision, which is clear-
ly applicable in the case the lending company is a third
party (that will say the lending company had no direct
or indirect shareholding in the borrowing company).
The Portuguese Government alleged, however, that the
rule could only be applied where there was a matter of a
direct or indirect shareholding, thus not in the case of a
third party. Because this interpretation of the Portu-
guese rule was in contravention of the clear legislative
text, the CJEU observed that the Portuguese rules were
not in line with the requirements of legal certainty
because the scope of the regulations could not be estab-
lished with sufficient precision. The similarity of this
case with Commission/Greece and SIAT is that in those
cases, the CJEU also based their interpretation of the
principle of legal certainty on statements of the relevant
Member State. It can be derived from these cases that
when the Member State concedes to the CJEU that a
certain legislative text gives reason for uncertainty, the
CJEU declares the legislation contrary to the principle
of legal certainty.
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4 Reasonableness Test in
Breach of the EU Principle of
Legal Certainty?
The matter which is researched in this article is whether
the reasonableness test in the PPT rule is contrary to the
EU principle of legal certainty; here I discuss that from
various points of view.
4.1 Commission/Greece; SIAT and Itelcar
As has been mentioned above, reference is made in liter-
ature especially to SIAT and Itelcar for the substation
that the reasonableness test of the PPT rule is contrary
to the principle of legal certainty. In this regard, it is
remarked that the PPT rule brings too much uncertain-
ty and that, after citing the grounds from SIAT and
Itelcar, is thus contrary to the principle of legal certain-
ty. No further substantiation is given. In my view, this
interpretation takes the rulings in SIAT and Itelcar
about the principle of legal certainty out of their con-
text. When they are read in the context of the case, one
must come to the conclusion that those cases cannot be
applied to the PPT rule: As I have demonstrated in Sec-
tion 4 of this article, the CJEU did not independently
come to the conclusion in SIAT or Itelcar or Commis-
sion/Greece, that the national legislation in those cases
was contrary to the principle of legal certainty. The
CJEU only came to this conclusion because the Member
State itself had admitted that the rule was not clear, pre-
cise and predictable. Furthermore, in all those cases,
contravention with the legal principle of legal certainty
was an extra argument to deem the provision contrary to
EU law.
4.2 Is Independent Invoking of the Principle of
Legal Certainty Possible?
The authors in literature who defend that the reasona-
bleness test is contrary to the principle of legal certainty
assume that when the PPT rule is applicable, the princi-
ple of legal certainty such as applied in the case law of
the CJEU can be invoked. In the cases discussed here in
Section 4, we see that in those cases, another contraven-
tion of EU law was also at issue: in Commission/Greece
Directive 69/335/EEC, in SIAT and Itelcar the EU
Treaty freedoms.
The PPT rule does not appear to me to be in contraven-
tion of the EU Treaty freedoms. Assume that the PPT
rule is applicable, then that would mean that the bene-
fits under the relevant tax treaty would not be granted.
This could then mean juridical double taxation arises.
Juridical double taxation, however, on the basis of cases
such as Kerckhaert–Morres,38 does not constitute a
restriction of the EU Treaty freedoms but is a ‘result
38. CJEU 14 November 2006, C-513/04, Kerckhaert-Morres.
from the exercise in parallel by two Member States of
their fiscal sovereignty’.39
The question remains whether the principle of legal cer-
tainty can be invoked independently, also if the remain-
ing EU law is not applicable. To me, in principle, this
would seem impossible. In order to invoke the EU prin-
ciple of legal certainty, EU law as such must first be
applicable.
4.3 Reasonableness Test to be Found in the Case
Law of the CJEU Itself: The Objectified
Intention/Genuine and Economic Reality-
test
4.3.1 Reasonableness Test and Abuse Test in the Case
Law of the CJEU: Comparable
The reasonableness test requires that the tax authority
must make on the basis of all facts and circumstances an
objective analysis that obtaining a benefit is one of the
principal purposes of an arrangement. The subjective
intention (principal purpose) is hereby derived from this
objective analysis. We see a similar test, which can also
be called the ‘objectified intention test’40 in the abuse of
law case law of the CJEU. One example is the Halifax
case (a VAT case) in which for the application of the
subjective intention, the CJEU observed that the ‘essen-
tial aim of the transactions’ (emphasis added) must be
examined. In Weald leasing, another VAT case, the
CJEU considered (paragraph 30): ‘Second, it must also
be apparent from a number of objective factors that the
essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain a
tax advantage’. In Thin Cap GLO,41 a direct taxation
case, the CJEU considered (paragraph 82): ‘national leg-
islation which provides for a consideration of objective and
verifiable elements in order to determine whether a trans-
action represents a purely artificial arrangement,
entered into for tax reasons alone’ (emphasis added).
The objectified intention test is elaborated further in the
case law of the CJEU in the genuine test (also called the
economic reality test). In the Cadbury Schweppes-case,42
the CJEU considered in that regard that abuse existed
when there were ‘wholly artificial arrangements which
do not reflect economic reality’. For this, it must be
examined whether there were ‘objective circumstances’
(paragraph 64) that reflect an ‘economic reality’ (para-
graph 65); the CJEU pointed out in that regard to
‘objective factors which are ascertainable by third par-
ties with regard, in particular, to the extent to which the
(company) physically exists in terms of premises, staff
and equipment’ (paragraph 67). From Cadbury
Schweppes, it is also shown that only pointing out a tax
benefit is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that
39. Different: Koriak, above n. 21; Koriak is of the opinion that there is a
restriction, but in that regard, does not discuss the Kerckhaert–Morres
case, a case that points to another direction. I therefore do not agree
with his analyses.
40. See Weber (June 2013), above n. 35, part 1, at 253.
41. CJEU 13 March 2007, case C-524/04, Thin Cap GLO.
42. CJEU September 2006, case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes.
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this is abuse.43 It is shown from, amongst others, the
Foggia case44 that to answer the question of whether
abuse is present, all circumstances must be weighed
against each other. A tax benefit (in that case, large los-
ses) cannot in itself be considered decisive (paragraph 39
of Foggia): ‘However, the fact that those tax losses are
very substantial and that their origin has not been clear-
ly determined may constitute an indicator of tax evasion
or avoidance’, according to the CJEU. As is shown from
Foggia, abuse can be even present when an arrangement
is not artificial. When the tax benefits are much higher
than the (genuine) economic benefit,45 after having
weighed those facts against each other, one can come to
the conclusion that the principal purpose of an arrange-
ment is to obtain a tax benefit, even if nothing is artifi-
cial.
In my view, the economic reality test that can be found
in the case law of the CJEU is comparable to the reason-
ableness test in de OECD PPT rule.46 In the economic
reality test, namely, account is also taken of (i) all rele-
vant facts and circumstances (see, for example, Thin
Cap GLO); (ii) which must be weighed (Foggia); (iii) in
an objective analysis (Cadbury Schweppes: artificial ver-
sus economic reality/genuine); the last objective analy-
sis is present in the case law of the CJEU given that it
must be determined whether an arrangement is ‘wholly
artificial’ or if it concerns a ‘genuine’ arrangement. This
should be subjected to an objective assessment: what is
genuine in such a situation? What is artificial in such a
situation? The answer to this is, to ask yourself what a
third (reasonable) person in such a situation should do.
This is comparable with the OECD PPT rule: in point
11 of the Commentary it is remarked that ‘the determi-
nation requires reasonableness suggesting that the possi-
bility of different interpretations of the events must be
objectively considered’. It follows from the Commenta-
ry, in my view, that the ‘facts and circumstances’ must
be interpreted such as a reasonable (third) person would
have interpreted those facts and circumstances. If a rea-
sonable person should qualify certain facts and circum-
stances as artificial, then the principal purpose of a
transaction will have been to obtain a tax benefit. This
means that so far the OECD PPT rule and the genuine
test from the CJEU case law are comparable. Also, the
43. See para. 38 of Cadbury Schweppes: ‘it follows that the fact that in this
case CS decided to establish CSTS and CSTI in the IFSC for the avowed
purpose of benefiting from the favourable tax regime which that estab-
lishment enjoys does not in itself constitute abuse’. See also K. Len-
naerts, ‘The Concept of “Abuse of law” in the Case Law of the Europe-
an Court of Justice in Direct Taxation’, Maastricht Journal of European
and Comparative Law 329 (2015).
44. CJEU 10 November 2011, C-126/10, Foggia.
45. For instance: the tax benefit is EUR 10 million less tax paid and the
restructuring saves EUR 30,000 in reduced administrative costs (eco-
nomic benefit).
46. I agree with Marres/De Groot that the OECD PPT includes a genuine/
economic reality test, which is comparable with the test that can be
found in the case law of the CJEU regarding abuse of law and is con-
tained in the anti-abuse provision of the Parent–Subsidiary Directive
and in the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. See O.C.R. Marres and I.M.
de Groot, De algemene antimisbruikbepaling in de moeder-dochter-
richtlijn (deel 1), WFR 2015/7107, at 911.
fact that under the economic reality test of the CJEU, a
tax benefit does not constitute abuse as such, is the same
as under the OECD PPT (under which referring only to
the effects of an arrangement does not constitute abuse).
4.3.2 No Artificiality Required?
The economic reality test in the case law of the CJEU
and the PPT rule, however, are not entirely the same: it
is defendable that the OECD PPT rule is broader than
the genuine test, and that there is not only treaty abuse
under the OECD PPT rule in the case of an artificial
arrangement, but also when there are economic reasons
for a transaction but the tax benefits outweigh the eco-
nomic reasons. As observed here above, it is clear from
the Foggia case that abuse without an artificial arrange-
ment is also possible under the abuse case law of the
CJEU, so I expect that also on this point, the CJEU will
not have a problem with this broader test. True, it can-
not be argued with 100% certainty that the CJEU will
permit such a broader test. The Foggia case concerned
the Merger Directive and the anti-abuse provision in
that directive does not contain an explicit artificiality
test. The GAAR under the Anti-Tax Avoidance Direc-
tive47 and the GAAR under the Parent–Subsidiary
Directive in particular require that there must be artifi-
ciality if there is to be abuse.48 When the CJEU requires
an artificiality test under the GAARs of these Direc-
tives, the PPT rule must be interpreted in conformity
with these Directives, and thus be limited to artificial
arrangements alone.
4.3.3 Opinion in Literature
In literature, doubts are raised as to whether the OECD
PPT rule does contain an economic reality test and
therefore, on this basis, it is defended that the OECD
PPT rule is not in accordance with EU law.49 The
European Commission has recommended to the Mem-
ber States that in the case they include the OECD PPT
rule in a tax treaty, the Member State insert herein an
explicit ‘genuine economic activity’ test.50 I emphasise
that for the sake of clarity (and therefore the legal cer-
tainty) that this explicit inclusion of such a test should
be welcomed, but as said, in my view, the PPT rule
already contains such a test. When an arrangement is
artificial, it will be, in most cases, also under OECD
PPT rule, set up to obtain a tax benefit as one of the
principal purposes. The only potential problem I see is
that the PPT rule is broader (no artificiality required)
compared to the GAAR in the Anti-Tax Avoidance
47. See Article 6 of Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down
rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning
of the internal market.
48. See Weber (2016), above n. 5.
49. See Koriak, above n. 21, at 556.
50. See 28 January 2016, no. C-2016 271 final; Commission Recommenda-
tion on the implementation of measures against tax treaty abuse, H&I
2016/48. See also, with regard to the main purpose test in the OECD-
LOB provision, European Commission, Working document, Brussels 10
September 2014, Taxud D3, Working party IV – Direct taxation, OECD
BEPS Action 6 draft: “Limitation On Benefits” provisions – interaction
with EU law, at 10, published in Highlights & Insights on European Tax-
ation 2015/395.
57
Dennis Weber doi: 10.5553/ELR.000081 - ELR August 2017 | No. 1
Directive and that under the Parent–Subsidiary Direc-
tive (see above).
4.3.4 Conclusion
To conclude: In light of the fact that the reasonableness
test in the OECD PPT and abuse case law such as is
applied by the CJEU itself in general are comparable, I
doubt whether the CJEU would rule that such a test is
in contravention of the EU principle of legal certainty.
The only potential problem is that the PPT rule is
broader (no artificiality required) as compared to the
GAARs in the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the
Parent–Subsidiary Directive.
4.4 Does the Reasonableness Test Lead to Too
Much Discretion of the Tax Administration?
The question is whether the discretion the tax authori-
ties have in applying the PPT rule is contrary to EU
law. According to Kemmeren,51 the reasonableness test
leads to too much uncertainty to taxpayers, and this is
contrary not only to the requirement of legal certainty,
but also to the Biehl case.52
4.4.1 Biehl
The Biehl case concerned a refund rule for too much tax
paid. This rule gave no right to a refund of too much tax
paid in the case that a taxpayer was only a resident tax-
payer in Luxembourg part of the year, because he had
taken up residence in the country or left it during the
course of the tax year. The CJEU was of the opinion
that this was a matter of a covert form of discrimination
against nationality (paragraph 14):
Even though the criterion of permanent residence in
the national territory referred to in connection with
obtaining any repayment of an over-deduction of tax
applies irrespective of the nationality of the taxpayer
concerned, there is a risk that it will work in particu-
lar against taxpayers who are nationals of other Mem-
ber States. It is often such persons who will in the
course of the year leave the country or take up resi-
dence there.
During the hearing at the Court, the tax administration
observed that there exists in Luxembourg law a non-
contentious procedure allowing temporarily resident
taxpayers to obtain repayment of an over-deduction of
tax by adducing the unfair consequences, which the
application Luxembourg tax law entailed for them. On
this rule, the CJEU observed that, the Luxembourg
government ‘has not cited any provision imposing an
obligation on the administration of the contributions to
remedy in every case the discriminatory consequences
arising for the application of the national provisions at
issue’ (emphasis added). In his Opinion (point 19), AG
Darmon referred to the case law of the CJEU as ‘mere
administrative practices’,53 ‘which by their nature are
51. Kemmeren, above n. 2.
52. CJEU 8 May 1990, C-175/88, Biehl.
53. CJEU 4 April 1974, 167/73, Commission/French Republic [1974] 359,
paras. 46 and 47.
alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the
appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constitut-
ing the proper fulfilment of obligations under the Trea-
ty’.54
It follows from Biehl that the CJEU was of the opinion
that the Luxembourg non-contentious procedure was
not sufficiently legally binding (no obligation) to remove
the contravention of EU law. In other words: the rule
allowed too much discretionary power to the tax author-
ities. The tax authorities were able to apply the rule as
they thought fit; there was no legal obligation.
4.4.2 Biehl versus the Reasonableness Test
The question is whether the discretion that the tax
authorities had in Biehl is also of importance to the rea-
sonableness test in the PPT rule.
Under the reasonableness test in the PPT rule, the tax
authorities also have discretion, in the sense that they
are not obliged to apply the PPT rule. In addition, based
on the reasonableness test, they must substantiate their
assessment on the basis of objective circumstances.
Depending on the case, those will always be different
circumstances. This, however, is a different situation to
that under discussion in Biehl. In Biehl, there was a mat-
ter of a covert discrimination against nationality because
taxpayers who exercised the free movement in Luxem-
burg could not claim a refund of too much tax paid. The
Luxembourg government responded to this during the
hearing of the Court that this disadvantage could be
removed by the Luxembourg non-contentious proce-
dure, but the CJEU dismissed this argument because
there was no obligation of the tax authorities to apply
that procedure. Due to this, the discrimination could
thus continue to exist in certain situations.
The PPT rule as such is not contrary to EU law, but the
application of the PPT rule can give rise to juridical
double taxation, but this, as such, is not contrary to EU
law (see on this in paragraph 5.3 here above). Non-
application of the PPT rule does not lead to a contra-
vention of EU law as such, because the non-application
of the PPT rule leads to the application of the tax treaty,
and precisely due to this, double taxation could be
reduced.
As said, the reasonableness test only emphasises that the
tax administration must substantiate their assessment
that obtaining a benefit is one of the principal reasons of
an arrangement on the basis of an objective analysis of
objective circumstances. Assumptions are not permit-
ted. Moreover, an assessment based merely on the
effects of an arrangement is not sufficient.
To me, this would not seem to be contrary to the princi-
ple of legal certainty; The reasonableness test in fact
underlines the principle of legal certainty: when a tax
treaty is applicable, a taxpayer may invoke the benefits
of this treaty, unless, but this must be based on an
objective analysis of the facts and circumstances, that
obtaining a tax benefit is one of the principal reasons of
an arrangement.
54. CJEU 15 October 1986, Commission/Italy [1986] ECR 2945.
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4.4.3 Discretion and EU-Law
The Leur–Bloem case,55 in my opinion, is of importance
as regards the discretion the tax authorities have.56
From Leur–Bloem it is clear that a discretionary power
of the tax administration not to apply EU law on the
basis of evasion or abuse (in this case, the fiscal EU
Merger Directive) is not permitted. It is clear that oth-
erwise, the principle of legal certainty would be at risk.
Specifically, with regard to advance consent or permits/
licences, which contain a deviation from the fundamen-
tal freedoms, the Court of Justice has developed case
law on the basis of which it is clear that an assessment
by an administrative body is permitted when ‘based on
objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known
in advance, in such a way as to circumscribe the exercise
of the national authorities’ discretion, so that it is not
used arbitrarily’.57 We see a similar judgement regard-
ing the discretionary power of administrative bodies in
the area of directives, such as in Fazenda Pública.58 In
this case, the Court of Justice considered with regard to
the level of discretion of the tax administration under
the Sixth VAT Directive,
[a] distinction must be drawn between the case where
a Member State attempts to ensure the transposition
of a directive by giving an administrative authority a
discretionary power to apply its provisions, without
circumscribing the administrative authority’s discre-
tion [which is not permitted], and the case, examined
here, where the national legislature adopts, in a bind-
ing rule of law, the criteria set out in the directive and
then leaves it to an administrative authority to imple-
ment them. [which is permitted].59
If we apply this by analogy to the PPT rule, it cannot be
said that the PPT rule is a rule that does not define the
exercise of the national authorities’ discretion. The fact
that the answer to the question of when abuse is present
cannot always be answered with 100% certainty before-
hand (as it is dependent on the circumstance of each
case) is inherent to the concept of ‘abuse’ itself.60
5 Conclusion
The OECD BEPS Action 6 report contains a PPT
rule61 for the purpose of combating abuse of tax treaties.
55. CJ 17 July 1997, case C-28/95 (Leur-Bloem), para. 44.
56. This part is based on: Dennis Weber and Thidaporn Sirithaporn, ‘Legal
Certainty, Legitimate Expectations, Legislative Drafting, Harmonization
and Legal Enforcement in European Tax Law’, in Brokelind (ed.), Princi-
ple of Law: Function, Status and Impact in EU Tax Law, IBFD (2014), at
235.
57. See, amongst others, ECJ 12 July 2001, case C-157/99 (Smits en Peer-
booms), ECR I-5473, para. 90.
58. CJ 14 December 2000, case C-446/98 (Fazenda Pública), ECR I-11
435.
59. Id., para. 34.
60. See D. Weber, Tax Avoidance and the EX Treaty Freedoms, EUCOTAX,
Kluwer Law International (2005), at 234.
61. See BEPS Action 6, above n. 1.
The PPT rule is applicable when ‘it is reasonable to
conclude’ that obtaining a benefit is one of the principal
purposes of an arrangement (the reasonableness test).
First, it is held in the literature that the reasonableness
test of the PPT rule would be contrary to the European
Union’s principle of legal certainty. Reference is made
in this regard to the judgments of the CJEU in SIAT
and Itelcar. Second, it is held in literature that the
OECD PPT rule gives the tax authorities too much dis-
cretion and, therefore, is not in line with EU law (based
on the Biehl case). It is also held in literature that the
OECD PPT rule does not contain a genuine economic
activity test and therefore, is not in line with EU law.
In this contribution, I have defended that it does not
follow from the cases SIAT and Itelcar that the reasona-
bleness test is contrary to the principle of legal certainty.
Those authors who hold a different view take, in my
view, the relevant grounds of those judgments out of the
context of the case. When they are read in the context of
the case, one must come to the conclusion that those
cases cannot be applied to the PPT rule.
The reasonableness test is also not contrary to EU law
because this gives too much discretion to the tax author-
ities. The reasonableness test in fact underlines the prin-
ciple of legal certainty: when a tax treaty is applicable, a
taxpayer may invoke the benefits of this treaty, unless –
but this must be based on an objective analysis of the
facts and circumstances – obtaining a tax benefit is one
of the principal purposes of an arrangement.
Finally, in light of the fact that the reasonableness test
in the OECD PPT rule and the abuse case law as
applied by the CJEU itself in general are comparable, I
doubt whether the CJEU would rule that such a test is
in contravention of the EU principle of legal certainty or
with another principle in EU law. The only potential
problem I see is that the OECD PPT rule is broader (no
artificiality required) compared to the GAARs in Anti-
Tax Avoidance Directive and the Parent–Subsidiary
Directive.
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